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CAPE LIBERALISM IN ITS TERMINAL PHASE
P. LEWSEN
Historians differ widely on the scope and significance of
Cape liberalism. The lay public has forgotten it; the
tradition did not survive Union either as an effective
pressure group or a dispersed but influential body of senti-
ment. Some habits and institutions lingered on, such as
multiracial trams and trains for some decades in the Cape,
delays in imposing pass-laws and curfews, and the attenuated
survival of the qualified non-racial Cape male franchise
(while white men and women had universal franchise). The
Cape Native common-roll franchise was abolished by Hertzog
in 1936 and replaced by a limited communal franchise: and
the Coloured vote disappeared in 1960 after the sordid
trickery of a specially enlarged Senate. (In terms of the
South Africa Act the Cape franchise was protected or en-
trenched - it was believed permanently - by the need for a
two-thirds majority of both Houses voting together before it
could be altered.)
Residual influences remained in such bodies as Civil
Rights Leagues, the Institute of Race Relations, the now de-
funct Liberal Party, a portion of the Progressive Party and
Nusas. The underlying attitudes are individual and person-
al: and this too is in line with Cape liberalism. Thus
Rene de Villiers wrote recently in his obituary of Margaret
Ballinger, Cape Native Representative, a founder and leader
of the Liberal Party, and a speaker on innumerable Civil
Rights and Race Relations platforms, that she was 'a liberal
bred in the tradition of the old ,Cape Colony. That was a
tradition founded on the assumption of the common humanity,
the common rights and therefore the common loyalties of all
members of a complex society1. He added that our departure
from this tradition after Union and especially after 1949
'has been the major tragedy of our history in the twentieth
century1-1 The description of Margaret Ballinger applies
equally to his own subjective experience as a Cape-style
liberal.
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This obituary seems an elegy rather than a 'terminal
phase1. Instead, after a brief factual summary, the inten-
tion of my paper is to re-examine the Cape liberal tradition
in the light of recent research and criticism. Three
scholars are of special importance: Colin Bundy, Martin
Legassick and Stanley Trapido.2 They have rigorously ana-
lysed liberalism as a class phenomenon; and Bundy in his
articles and his book, The Rise and Fall of the South
African Peasantry, has provided a seminal'examination of
an almost neglected area, the Cape peasantry. My own
primary research in this period has been partially re-
examined in the light of these critical revaluations, which
in turn have been tested against the documentary factual
material. (This whole problem needs to be studied in
depth and in detail, and only a small but suggestive segment
has been studied comparatively.)3
Historically Cape liberalism was foisted on a hostile com-
munity when Ordinance 50 in 1828, at the behest of the
ruling British colonial power, removed all pass-laws, and
punitive and differential legislation from the Khoi, and
swung a slave-owning community legally towards equal rights
for all before the law. With the abolition of slavery,
this great turn (in J.S. Marais1 words)4 was complete. The
gap in status and wealth was too great, however, for rights
to be equal; and as H.J. and R.E. Simons have shown,
supposedly colour-blind Masters' and Servants1 Acts were
distorted by clauses applying specially to stock-thieves and
vagrants.5 Attempts at more stringent 'class1 punishments
were sometimes foiled by the handful of liberals, who worked
in a favourable parliamentary equilibrium (the balance be-
tween English and 'Dutch1 or Afrikaner Bond representatives).
In addition protective 'class legislation1, safeguarding
African land and prohibiting or limiting strong drinks, was
wedged into the law. The term 'class legislation1 was the
one used by the liberals themselves in their defiant if awk-
ward justifications - for like English Liberals they accep-
ted the doctrines of laissez-faire and the neutral night-
watchman state, especially in economic relations. But
colour feeling and a belief in a white ruling elite was
interwoven with paternalism - which is itself 'the colonisa-
tion of the mind1 (as Leo Kuper, following Fanon, has
emphasized)6 and thus vitiates 'equal rights' for both the
recipient and the doer. The Cape liberals were partly aware
of this dilemma.
Cape liberalism was thus exotic, conservative and defen-
sive, as was natural in a hostile society. It was not
democratic, for as in England liberals saw the vote as a
responsibility not a right, and as attaching to property.
It was thus always an elitist doctrine; but in the Cape by
1853-4, when the first Parliamentary constitution - limited
to representative government, with an official executive -
was granted, it was sufficiently acclimatized to have
rallied a small group of local supporters, and it continued
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to expand slowly until Union.? It aimed at just adminis-
stration and the preservation of political and civil rights,
not at their expansion; it took society for what it was, it
sought to safeguard what had been won and not to reform or
radicalise. This was especially conspicuous in the
economic field, where liberals as good bourgeois citizens
shared the values and motivations of those around them. To
the lower and coloured classes their attitude was bene-
volent, complacent and condescending. They saw as axioms
that whites were in the vanguard of progress; that tradi-
tional societies were barbarous and civilization a single
ladder: its bottom rungs were conversion to Christianity,
the dignity of labour and the purchase of manufactured goods
(beginning with trousers and bibles) . As the century ad-
vanced, even humane and educated men were deeply influenced
by Social Darwinism. They believed in the survival of the
fittest, the reality of genetically superior and inferior
races and in Kipling's 'lesser breeds'. Nor were such
beliefs confined to bourgeois liberals. Marx and Engels
had taken it for granted in 1848 that the Teutonic German
race had a natural right to rule the inferior Slavs.
Politically, liberals upheld civil rights and the rule
of law, the independence of the courts and freedom of speech,
worship and the press, and put their faith in parliamentary
government; they saw the non-racial franchise as the key-
stone of the Cape system. They believed that the lower
orders should be encouraged to uplift themselves by hard
work, sobriety and duty. They believed that working for
white employers both elevated and enriched, besides civili-
zing the labourer. This,was the recipe for the 'surplus
population1 whom population pressures and natural disasters,
taxation and increased consumer needs squeezed in their tra-
ditional lands and in the Crown locations. The remedy for
the landless and impoverished was dutifully to labour for a
season on mines, railways and farms. Wages were deter-
mined by economic processes, and unless gross inequities
caused an artificial shortage, it was not the business of
the liberal to criticize them. in land tenure they favoured
individual holdings, because these taught the advantages and
responsibilities of citizenship - and also because they did
not shelter extended families, so that the surplus popular-
tion was exposed. The liberals, in addition, welcomed the
signs of economic differentiation - of peasants who through
individual effort were emerging as farmers, and traditional
cultivators who were becoming peasants - as the reward for
thrift and enterprise. Finally they strongly disapproved
of the muddled form of land tenure which enabled white
farmers to rent out their farms in exchange for money pay-
ments to groups of Africans (rent squatters); but they were
far more tolerant of the exchange of labour services for
land (labour squatters). They did not object to town
settlements, and favoured ownership and the family occupa-
tion of the plots provided in town locations. To sum up.
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they belonged to their times, and though many of their
assumptions would be regarded as racist today, in a society
so steeped with racialism the liberals emerged as what they
were: a conscientious and (within limits) humanitarian
elite, intelligent and highminded, who acted both pragmati-
cally and on principle - and who did not need to look too
far ahead.
The Cape tradition was thus distorted by contradictions,
as well as by the prejudices and idiosyncrasies of indivi-
dual liberals. One member' of Merriman's ministry, Henry
Burton, for example, stated in a report that the unfortunate
missionary-taught habit of wearing clothes increased the
spread of tuberculosis,8 Merriman himself, more justifi-
ably, complained in a discussion on education: 'If the
missionaries would only give their pupils fewer hymnbooks
and more ready reckoners it would set their pupils up econo-
mically and make them better citizens1.9 Sauer, that
exemplar of the Liberal virtues, (before the 1913 Land Act),
confessed in a 1908 debate on education: 'I think there is
much to be said for the opinion that it would be better if
the black man and the white man lived here in separate con-
tinents '.1° Despite a great deal of common ground with
revisionist historians I cannot, however, find evidence of
the Cape liberal merchant/missionary axis which Bundy,
following Trapido, so frequently emphasises. The mission-
ary part of the 'axis1 is self-evident: from the forties
onwards, as Bundy stresses and illustrates, British mission-
aries tought the virtues of crop production for the market -
in short, the transformation of the heathen into loyal
Christian peasants with 'civilized' material needs. Like-
wise merchants favoured the profitable exchange of agricul-
tural produce and manufactured goods, and built up a
valuable trade (which included such curious objects as
ladies' gloves). But with rare exceptions one does not
find a bloc of liberal merchants either participating in
Border politics or in Parliament - (J.J. Irvine, who was
both a King William's Town trader and a farmer, is cited,
but only as trader).11 Of the leading Liberals, in the
span until Union, Saul Solomon was a newspaper editor; so
were H. Walton and Cartwright; Sir James Rose-Innes was an
advocate and his brother a lawyer; Richard Solomon was also
an advocate; Merriman was initially a surveyor, then an un-
happy mine manager (very briefly) and from the 1890s a
farmer; J.M. Orpen was a surveyor; J.w. Sauer and H. Burton
were lawyers; Bisset Berry and Meiring Beck were doctors;
S.C. Cronwright-Schreiner ( who married Olive Schreiner and
took her name) was a farmer. One notes, too, that over a
third of the white students who had studied at the multi-
racial Lovedale missionary school became farmers12 and
presumably a proportion kept some imprint of their education
and did not yield to bloc-prejudices. Moreover, the Eng-
lish 'Border1 towns and municipalities were often notorious-
ly illiberal. Port Elizabeth was a leading example, and in
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East London a by-law prevented Indians from using pavements.
Nor is Trapido convincing on Aliwal North as a centre of
his •small1 or 'micro1 liberal tradition. A succession of
M.P.s, headed by W.P. Sauer, were indeed liberals. But
Aliwal North was exceptional, because the number of black
voters in this two-member constituency was large enough to
return a candidate if the black voters used only one of
their votes. 13 in 1904 when Sauer was defeated, the black
electorate was divided but it was the loss of disfranchised
Afrikaner votes (the punishment for war-time rebellion)
which cost him his seat, and certainly no rush of merchant-
liberals emerged to save.him. The 'small1 tradition, like
the merchant/liberal axis, is not proven.
Capitalism as has often been demonstrated, can adapt it-
self to any political system or ideology. It has even
made inroads on Communism - for example, the state capita-
lism of the U.S.S.R. and the steady infiltration of the
great multi-national combines into China. On the other
hand, the Cape mercantile capitalist interests, in the per-
iod when Bundy shows that the market-oriented peasantry
flourished, did not form a liberal front or offer a liberal
lead any more than they did in Natal, where there were also
missionaries, traders and an active and economically viable
peasantry. But there was no Natal liberal tradition.
Equally unsupported is the assumption that liberal is a
synonym for capitalist. Thus Bundy blames 'the stern logic
of nineteenth-century liberalism1 for the callous statements
by unnamed persons that the rinderpest cattle disaster had
the merit of replacing pastoral by labour habits amongst the
severest sufferers of cattle losses.14 The syllogism is:
all liberals were capitalists; hence all capitalist-exploi-
ters were liberals. Yet the rinderpest coincides with a
populist movement, described by Alan Jeeves, of revulsion
against mine-owners and capitalists because they were
allegedly plotting for war in order to feed their insatiable
demands for cheapened labour. Such sentiments were super-
ficial. But Hobsonian ideas found a ready acceptance among
Cape liberals and their non-liberal Bond supporters during
and after the Anglo-Boer war.
This confusion in terminology is linked with a misconcep-
tion and exaggeration of the size and influence of liberals.
It is supported by the correct but yet simplistic generali-
sation that all white South Africans were avid for cheap
black labour, and believed that it should be encouraged, in-
duced, economically constrained or compelled. But liberals
did not support compulsion. For example, Merriman was
deeply shocked in 1903 when Botha in his evidence before the
Transvaal Labour Commission 'advocated very drastic measures
with respect to the Natives - which if they meant anything
meant confiscation of land on score of laziness and some-
thing very like compulsory labour...I...took the first oppor-
tunity of disclaiming his utterance and condemning his
policy, stating that if correctly reported what he said was
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"ruinous, unstatesmanlike and suicidal"... I am sure you will
agree with me that no sympathy for the Boer cause will ever
excuse any sort of departure from a liberal Native policy.
For my own part I have always recognized the great danger
that lay in the chance of Milner and his friends attempting
to reconcile the two European races at the cost of the
Black1.
To unravel these complexities it is necessary to identify
factually what distinguished Cape liberalism from the il-
liberal Cape tendencies and the pervasive South African
views and practices. Two very clear strands will then be
apparent. The first is the administrative arid legal tradi-
tion; with the exception of the pass law (obsolete in the
Colony by the eighties and used as a kind of passport in the
Transkei) and the restrictive liquor legislation, there were
no differential Cape laws.15 But in practice, as the
Simons have pointed out and Bundy confirms. Masters1 and
Servants1 Laws, for example, were amended so as to impose
special punishments for black offences. The law itself,
however, remained colour-blind, in accordance (to quote
Sauer on the eve of Union) with 'the sound doctrine of
equal rights1.16 Besides this self-deception - for the
'sound doctrine1 was often infringed - the existence of a
separate code of law and administration for the Cape's
dependency, the Transkei, implied segregated habits which
pre-existed the Transkeian annexations of the 1880s. By
contrast, in the Ciskeian regions of the Colony, Sir George
Grey had struggled to create an integrated settlement. The
•checkboard1 pattern that resulted was one of single white
farms juxtaposed with Crown locations or segregated areas.
Furthermore, the habit of territorial segregation was so
deeply ingrained in the Cape that it was automatically
applied to groups of urban blacks who settled in and around
the towns. Christopher Saunders has given an excellent
example in the setting up of the Ndabeni locations outside
Cape Town in 1902, partly because of a plague scare but
basically because of the belief in segregation as the natu-
ral social development.1*? Even where a small number of
Africans collected as 'rent squatters' or 'labour squatters'
on farms, paying for the privilege of grazing and farming
land either in cash or labour, this grouping was known as* a
'farm location1.
Bundy, Trapido and Legassick are therefore too restricted
in their timing when they see segregation as taking hold of
the Cape only between the Anglo-Boer War and 1913 Land Act.
Segregation was an agglomeration of practices, ranging from
the social to the administrative, the political and the
geographic. There is ample evidence to show that even
prominent Cape liberals tended towards political segregation
in the earlier period: and even more evidence to confirm
that they were drawn to it at the beginning of the twentieth
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century.* But the change was not a sudden one, associated
primarily with the growth of the mines1 labour demands and
Cape sympathy for this growth. It was far more subtle,
enduring and complex; and initially and conspicuously, it
was the illiberal groups who opposed geographic segregation,
for example, before Rhodes1 Glen Grey Act was passed.
(Rhodes, however, appeased his followers by denying the
franchise to the holders of the individual Glen Grey plots
and by imposing his notorious - but in the end unworkable -
labour tax.) During the preceding controversy, Innes wrote
this ambivalent letter to his friend, the fellow-liberal,
Dr. Berry:
...whatever the ultimate scheme may be the main
thing to keep in view is that the locations should
be preserved as reservoirs of labour, but should
be at the same time so regulated that the owners
of plots have some motive for improvement upon
them, and that those who do not honestly live from
the soil should go out and work for their sup-
port.
Of course the object of the Bond, and I am
afraid of the Government, is to countenance the
slow but sure breaking up of these locations, and
after that what? For my part I feel so strongly
the necessity of preserving the soil for these
people that I shall be perfectly prepared to
surrender their claim to vote in regard to it for
the present. That is to say, I will be prepared
(if the plots are inalienable) to treat the land
for the purpose of the (Franchise) Act of 1887 as
communal land (and thus not qualifying as a pro-
perty-test for the vote).19
* In 1909 J.C. Molteno managed to get (Sir) W.B.M. Stanford
very confused on the question of segregation during the
evidence before the Stanford Commission on land-tenure.
Molteno asked: •Do you not think...as the Natives have a
very large extent of the best part of South Africa that we
should try to secure to the Europeans what belongs with
them?1 Stanford agreed in principle, but when Molteno put
this crisply,'So you do not think it would be unfair in any
way to the Native to legislate in the direction of securing
for the European farmer what he has got1, Stanford replied
that this brought up a difficult question, 'because the
Natives have hitherto been brought up to consider that they
are British subjects, having the same rights as others; and
when you have a civilized Native he considers he has a per-
fect right to purchase. It means a class distinction'.
Molteno: 'Quite so - they want equal rights - but they have
the right to purchase any land in the Native territories
with the exception of a few places which are set aside1.18 :
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During the debate, however, he opposed both this clause and
the labour tax (the latter without any mental reservations) .
On the other hand integration existed to a degree not
paralleled anywhere. When breached it was for two opposing
reasons: the desire to discriminate and the desire to pro-
tect. The liquor law and the preservation of such land as
remained are in the latter category. The most ardent
champion of the liquor law, which forbade strong drink to be
introduced into the.Transkei except under special permit,
and laid down the principle of 'local option1 or dry areas
for the Colony, was again Innes. 'I hold that no drink
ought to be sold to Natives. It only leads to stocksteal-
ing and all sorts of crime1, he wrote to an opponent in
1886.20 Merriman, however, would have gone further. He
would have limited the number of white canteens, and kept
down alcohol for all21 excepting good wines, which were a
'beverage not an intoxicant*. (Merriman was a wine-farmer.)
Protective or paternalist legislation in any form is not
'equal rights', and Merriman frankly admitted this when
challenged as a witness to SANAC (the South African Native
Commission, 1903-5), because he insisted on protecting black
land, but was prepared to allow free purchase of hiring of
farms in white areas.
Q. You would treat him differently from the
White man; you would not allow the Native '
to sell, but you would allow the European to
sell?
JXM. If the Native sold his land, he would not
get any other; he would be dispossessed.
Q. That is practically class legislation.
JXM. Yes, it is class legislation.22
The use of the term 'class1 and not 'race' is interesting,
because however rigid classes may in fact be, mobility im-
plicitly exists. With 'race1 there is no mobility because
differences are absolute. But the Cape use of the term
'class' was overlaid with the second meaning of race or
colour.
Legal and administrative segregation were implemented
through the Transkeian Code of Law and Government, contained
in the exhaustive Barry report. Merriman was the parlia-
mentary initiator and he never ceased to think the Transkei-
an Code an excellent piece of work, and the level of
magisterial rule and supervision equally admirable.23 His
first (and enduring) motives were expressed in a letter to
his mother in 1878 after the destructive NqikaGcaleka war,
and before the even more alarming 'Gun War1 rebellions.
Merriman wrote that he had been reading on
the condition of the population of India...All is
seemingly so fair under the shadow of our mighty
bureaucracy and our intentions, when we take the
trouble to form any, are so benevolent that from
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sheer ignorance we seem to have built up a tyran-
ny of law which is eating away the heart of
millions, and all because we will not recognize
the fact that their ways are not our ways...
I think much of the future of our Native races.
It looks dark at present and will do so as long
as we persist in regarding them as enemies and in
imagining that this place is ever going to be a
great European colony and shutting our eyes to the
manifest future,..of being the great controlling
power over the black races in the southern half of
the continent...2 4
On the latter he was manifestly wrong, but at least he had
shed his earlier cultural absolutism of seeing only white
British ways as morally and administratively valid.
The land occupied by blacks had been recognized as in-
alienable (after an initial struggle), first by convention
and then in 1903 by law. The right to rent or buy land
elsewhere, however, continued - though in the special case
of farm locations rental was attacked, regulated and highly
taxed. Legally in the Transkei there was now clear
differentiation, as Bundy and Trapido justifiably emphasize.
But the single motive they adduce is simplistic. The
background of recent warfare, in which Cape trampling on
indigeneous law was a specific grievance, is overlooked.
When the war ended the need to overhaul earlier assumptions,
and to accommodate Cape rule to traditional habits and
values, was carefully studied as a guiding principle. The
differentiation was not at first oppressive and was intended
to be permissive and not restrictive.
As for the extent of the land, this was imposed by mili-
tary defeats in what Saunders calls the Hundred Years War on
the frontier. The borders were not drawn to accommodate
labour demands after the gold discoveries (as Trapido
Suggests). They predate these discoveries. Land-hungry
farmers (mainly pastoralist) had absorbed the land of
conquered peoples. What remained proved inadequate, and
was interlarded with white settlement. But initially,
according to Bundy, subsistence agriculture produced enough
food for the black Transkeians; and as overcrowding and
impoverishment* became evident, these were not deliberately
accentuated to increase the labour supply; and while labour
was one remedy, so were the planned measures of amelioration,
* Cf. A.H. Stanford, the Chief Magistrate of the Transkei;
•For good or ill...the simple frugal life of Primitive
Kaffirdom is being gradually abandoned for the expensive
tastes of civilization, and...earnings...are not increasing
commensurately1. He thought that the yield from indirect
taxes was not 2s each, as estimated by SANAC, but 7s 6d p.a.,
and this increased tax burden, through rising consumer needs,
was a further drain on African resources.26
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such as agricultural instruction, free dipping and fencing,
etc. to help the marginal peasant. At the same time, the
number of labourers would automatically increase- The
'surplus population1, as the bluebooks simultaneously report,
would spontaneously see the need to go out and work - and
incidentally bring back their wages not only to their im-
poverished homes but to the impoverished Cape as a whole.
When one reads the variety of suggestions; for positive aid,
for stimulus of peasant farming, and for further corrective
action25 of what today we recognize as the underdevelopment
process - but was not then identified - one cannot accept
that the single overwhelming and deliberate motive in Trans-
keian administration was to use segregation to force out
labour to the mines at depressed wages. Shula Marks and
Anthony Atwood are thus overstating when they contend that
from the time of the mineral discoveries 'the demand for in-
digenous labour - in the greatest possible numbers at the
lowest cost - was to become the predominant concern of every
colonial interest - imperial officers. Cape liberals. Natal
segregationists as much as Afrikaner farmers and "cosmopoli-
tan" capitalists1. As regards 'Cape liberals' an important
preoccupation is being enlarged into a single dominant
motive. Even in respect of cheapness, Cape officials
deplored and hoped to correct the conditions of recruiting,
of travel, of health inspection and lack of hospitals and of
general working conditions. Thus it was not only the desire
to improve the flow of labour but humane concern with such
conditions that made men like Merriman as Prime Minister,
Henry Burton, (Minister of Justice), Dower (the Permanent
Secretary for Native Affairs), for example, negotiate for
improvement. Merriman had feared - and his fears were con-
firmed - that the experiment with indented Chinese labour on
the mines would depress wages and harm conditions for black
workers as they returned to the mines; and W.B.M. Stanford
(former chief magistrate of the Transkei) was realistically
aware that an increase of the labour turn-out would greatly
accelerate the ravages of tuberculosis.28 Steps had al-
ready been taken by 1909 to make medical examinations manda-
tory arid to press for the examination of recruits before
they left for the Witwatersrand.
What does bear a great resemblance to the impoverishment
of the territories - and without the complication of the
gold mines - is the picture drawn by the French historian,
E. le Roy Ladurie, of the peasants of Languedoc after their
spell of prosperity during the Renaissance.29 In the
seventeenth century, a sharp increase in population and a ..
run of bad seasons caused the subdivision of holdings, land-
shortage and acute impoverishment. What le Roy Ladurie
calls this process of 'pauperization...attacked the small-
holder whose numbers had multiplied without a sufficient
increase in real income per unit to compensate for the
shrinking land parcels1. One compares Bundy on the peasants
of the Herschel district: 'Between 1895 and 1899, peasant
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production in this district was disrupted by drought,
locusts and rinderpest1. Here as elsewhere, numerous
Africans were reduced to the most severe poverty - though
the richer survived economically.
I am again moving obliquely towards the two points which
help to define Cape liberalism. The first is that the so-
called Cape 'tradition1 was from the beginning an adminis-
trative tradition, pre-dating the grant of Representative
Government in 1853 and of Responsible Government in 1872.
It was concerned with benevolent and progressive government
and also with maintaining such 'equal rights1 as existed in
the Colony proper - (one notes in particular the role of
the judiciary). The sanction was the explicit responsibi-
lity, as representatives of what was deemed a higher form of
civilization, to provide just, equitable and elevating rule.
Thus when Legassick asserts that by the twentieth century
'while defending what it has achieved. Cape liberalism had
moved from a concern with equality before the law and with
the non-racial franchise to a study of the means of "liberal
and fair and just" administration of Africans who would not
be incorporated on equal terms in the common society1 he is
post-dating an administrative tradition coincident with Cape
liberalism. As to the latter part of his statement, it is
true that the habits of segregation (already described) had
infiltrated into education and urban management, for
example.32 But integration was also growing, in its poli-
tical and economic - though not its social - usages- More
blacks were entering the government service, while coloureds
fitted into the nascent trade union movement. Macmillan
recalled that residentially no attempt was made to interfere
with the way the coloureds lived 'scattered all through the
villages, hugger-mugger with their white neighbours1, that
the successful small tenants and market gardeners seemed to
be increasing and that; 'Until the Cape entered Union there
were normally at least one or two admitted annually to the
Victoria College1 (later the Stellenbosch University).33
And thanks to the non-discriminatory clause in the Charter
of the South African College in 1829 (which was intended to
refer to religious discrimination) the pressure from
Dr. Abdurahman, the 'Malay1 member of the Cape Town munici-
pal council, helped the embryo University of Cape Town to*
cross the university customary colour divide, and a coloured
student, Harold Cressy (later a distinguished headmaster)
was admitted in 1909. (It was not till the war years,
however, that black students were enrolled).34
To return for a moment to origins. The famous Cape
magistrate families - the Stanfords and the Brownlees -
were of missionary stock so that the Cape administrative
tradition was firmly rooted in a received morality. The
Cape official service likewise promoted 'civilizing' aims.
But this aspect of liberalism is not the same as its politi-
cal aspect. Firstly, Cape political liberalism had to ac-
climatise itself and not rely only on immigrants such as
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Saul Solomon and William Porter. Secondly, like their pre-
decessors, the next generation - and conversions were slow
- had a hard battle to defend existing usages and prevent
encroachments on 'equal rights1. They often succeeded,
because of their eloquence and the balance of political
forces in the Cape parliament. But they also failed - as
in the Effendi case*,35 and as in the Glen Grey restrictions
on the franchise and labour tax.
The greatest setback came with the annexation of the
Transkeian Territories from the mid-1880s. In 1887 the il-
liberal Sprigg government reluctantly extended the non-racial
franchise to the Transkei, with much prodding from the
liberals; but excluded all communally-held land from the
property qualification, so that only a minute fraction of
black Transkeians could obtain the vote. Next, in 1892 the
franchise qualifications were raised. The property test
was changed from £25 to £75, and a rudimentary education
test introduced (the aspirant voter's ability to write his
name, address and occupation). Except for the Glen Grey Act
limitation (on Glen Grey tenures as qualification) there were
no further attempts to tamper with the Cape franchise until
the crucial deprivations imposed by the National Convention
and incorporated into the Act of Union, These were the re-
moval of the right - which had never been exercised - of
coloured and black voters to stand for Parliament and to be
counted in delimiting the constituencies.
To return, however, to the political tradition in the last
phase of Cape Colony rule. Briefly, a very small liberal
opposition party had existed (between the break-up of the
first Rhodes Ministry in 1893 and the Jameson Raid at the
end of 1895). It totalled approximately ten to eleven
members in a House of 9335 and was very vigilant and active,
but in a conservative not an innovative sense: to retain
rather than to expand. With the schism between English and
Afrikaners after the Jameson Raid, liberals were scattered on
both sides, and some of the most prominent 'friends of the
natives' enlisted in the anti-imperialist side. What
Trapido appropriately calls 'electoral arithmetic' then be-
came important. So narrow was the electoral margin, espe-
cially in the seven Border seats, that both sides had to woo
the African vote; and this resulted in deliberate attempts
at ingratiation, and a new rhetoric, but also in the exper-
ience of working with a shrewd and alert electorate. Al-
though black voters were an elite, they saw themselves as
^representing the wider community, and were quick to express
* In Cape Town, where there was a four-member constituency
and all four votes could be plumped on one cadidate, the
chance that the Cape Malay leader, Ahmed Effendi, might be
elected led to the hurried abolition of plumping in 1893:
the liberals protested unavailingly at a 'dangerous prece-
dent to amend the constitution on personal grounds'.
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wants and grievances; while not only the local agents but
individual voters kept in touch with their elected M.P.s
(M.L,A.s) whenever matters affecting black interests sur-
faced.* The effects modified older attitudes and modes of
speech, but the political tradition remained superficial
except for a small but growing number of vigilant, able and
effective liberal parliamentarians.
This enlargement of numbers and the undoubted softening
of attitudes encouraged the liberals to believe that the
'Cape methods1 were now secure. With the shock of 1909,
and the attacks not only in parliament but by clergymen,
black and coloured organisations, and - most significantly -
the Afrikaner Bond on the betrayal of the principle of
equal rights by Cape delegates at the National Convention,
the comforting delusion was reiterated that the Cape exper-
ience would be repeated and the 'educative force1 of liberal
example would alter attitudes in the Union Parliament, and
liberalize South Africa through 'the leaven1 of Cape
example.38 Schreiner did not believe this; and Merriman's
ambivalence is shown by his letter to the Cape Governor, in
which he explains how fragile the liberal.tradition is, and
how easily a backlash might be provoked if the British
Government altered the Draft South Africa Act, He argued,
firstly, that the parliamentary exclusion, although illiber-
al, was the 'logical corollary of the exclusion of the
Coloured people from the franchise in the other three
Colonies; and secondly, that if Schreiner1s mission succee-
ded and thus wrecked Union, there might be grave repercus-
sions on Cape liberalism. 'As. Your Excellency is. aware, these
political rights are strongly supported by a minority only
and are father acquiesced in than warmly approved by the
majority, who hitherto have allowed themselves to be con-
vinced by leaders that on the whole the grant of political
priveleges to Natives and Coloureds is a safety valve1.
This small but influential leadership had taught their
..followers...through habit even to 'take pride in the super-
* For example, John Guzana of Keiskama Hoek wrote to JXM
on 31 January 1905, when JXM was no longer representing Wode-
house, to ask him to help him get a piece of freehold land
from Government lands. This illustrates two points, the
sense of accessibility by voters, and the eagerness to buy
farms - by those who could afford to do so - outside the
locations.37
* According to Basil Williams (then reporting the National
Convention for The Times), who was told by Sir Percy Fitz-
Patrick, Merriman fought for a general inclusive franchise
for all South Africa, and said 'that if it was not for (the)
Native vote barely three men in (the) Cape Houses would take
an interest in Natives1.40
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ior liberality of the Cape Colony'.39
Majority black feeling on this issue cannot be guaged.
The Transkeian General Council, representing- the wealthier
elite, did petition against the new 'colour-line1, as did
other organisations. The Council began with its usual
affirmations of loyalty and confidence. It went on to
declare:
...That your petitioners and the people they
represent in this Council view with grave appre-
hension the Act of Union which introduces a prin-
ciple hitherto foreign to the law of His Majesty's
Colony of the Cape of Good Hope...
That by this colour line your petitioners and
the people they represent are for ever excluded
from entrance into the Parliament of United South
Africa...
(In addition the Cape Colony is deprived of) a
great part of the preponderance of members in the
House of Assembly in the Union Parliament which
it might otherwise have enjoyed (through counting
only whites for delimiting the constituencies).
That even though none of your petitioners or
the people they represent have ever desired to or
attempted to enter the Legislative Houses of His
Majesty's Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, yet
they enjoyed the right of doing so had they so
desired.•.
(The explicit withdrawal of this right) is not
only a grievance but a withdrawal of rights which
they have enjoyed and which they have in no
instance abused...(They thus petition) that the
colour-line in the South Africa Act may be ex-
punged.41
Merriman's estimate to the Governor of liberal ambivalence
is confirmed by the evidence of Cape witnesses, a few years
earlier, to the immensely important South African Native
Affairs Commission (SANAC) of 1903-5. These are a few
samples. Merriman, in his evidence, emphasized the impor-
tance of the common-roll franchise and was equally emphatic
on the educative effects of individual land tenure; called
for a quickened pace in education; and for industrial
training and equal job opportunities: in response to the
challenge, 'Would they not immediately begin to compete with
the white man?1 he fired back: 'What is the converse of
that? Are you going to keep them back for the purpose of
giving a monopoly to white men?1 A Bondsman, P*R. Rabie
of Worcester, an up-to-date farmer, despite the needling of
the Commission 'really did not see how you are going to draw
a line in any way1 in the franchise, but showed some anxiety
about being ultimately outvoted. P.R. Malleson, manager of
the Cape Orchard Company in the Hex River Valley, did not
•agree with letting the Coloured men have too much to do with
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party politics1. (The terms Coloured and Native were used
interchangeably.) J.D.J. Visser, manager of the govern-
ment farm at Elsenberg, thought that there should be 'equal
rights1 in access to liquor, and likewise in voting - 'If he
is a good man1.
By contrast, the other three colonies were united in their
hostility to the Cape franchise. In Natal E-A. Brunner,
M.P. for Eshowe, would be fvery sorry' to. see a Native
franchise: 'I do not think they can possibly appreciate it
and might misuse it1. The two Free State witnesses, J.M.
van Reenen and C.H. Turvey, objected 'on principle1 to a
franchise on the Cape model. 'They are our inferiors in
every way1. And R.K. Loveday, a British Transvaaler,
favoured stringent segregation: 'My idea is that the two
races must be kept distinctly apart...if you do not wish to
breed a mongrel race1, and contended that 'the negro races
occupy the lowest position in the evolutionary scale1.
Trapido finds it difficult to explain the expansion of
support for the franchise in this period and thinks that the
need to reassure British policy-makers might have been a
motive. Both the Colonial Office and British policy-
makers, however, were fully satisfied with Cape administra-
tion in this period: it was they who had turned away from
the common franchise to different and loaded forms of re-
presentation, through a communal vote, as in New Zealand, or
through a hierarchy of councils: in short they were segre-
gatory on their attitude to representation.42 if libera-
lism had indeed become acceptable, as Trapido concedes, the
reasons are the more complex ones that Merriman outline:
the role of leadership - though within an equilibrium of
parties or white ethnic groups; the practical experience of
working the franchise; and the calibre of representatives
returned in these key constituencies. Liberalism, in its
last phase, was a viable if shallow tradition, but a consen-
sus had developed to shelter it.
The post-Onion history of Cape political liberalism shows
its vulnerability when the Cape parties were absorbed into
overwhelmingly colour-bar parties, and when the previous
economic dependence on the Transvaal changed into economic
integration. The administrative tradition proved somewhat
more enduring. Before Union it was most effectively ex-*
pressed in Merriman's premiership: firstly, because he was
intensely interested in administration,* and secondly, be-
cause he was the first explicitly liberal Cape prime
minister - though with all the ambiguities that this concept
involves plus his own idiosyncrasies. Paradoxically, his
government was responsible forgone repressive law, the
* Cf- the senior magistrate, W. Carmichael, who commended
•the quickening power, infusing life and imagination and
high purpose into the cold routine of ink and paper1 which
he saw as the distinguishing mark of Merriman's administra-
tion-
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Amended Native Locations Actf which has been strongly criti-
cized by Bundy for making labour tenancy on farm locations
prohibitively expensive, and thus helping to block off one
route of escaping wage-bondage and practising peasant agri-
culture.43
In explanation and partial extenuation it should be said
that Merriman genuinely believed that only formal individual
tenure, on properly surveyed plots, could improve and 'civi-
lize1 the tenant. He was also aware of the shortage of
land - an obvious motive for rent-squatting - and he inten-
ded to open up further land for African smallholders and
peasant farmers (though the shortage of Crown land would
have made this difficult) - But he legislated first, and
then sought remedies for land congestion - which by his own
frequent prescription was unwise and unjust. He hated
squatting and thought it a degrading and insecure method of
fanning; and he also emphasized its undoubted abuses: the
'rackrenting1 by unscrupulous absentee profit-seeking white
landowners and the static methods which were encouraged.
For farm locations, to his dismay, were frequently communal
- in some areas they represented the return of Africans to
lands from which they had been expelled by war and confis-
cation. The application of the doubled fee for rent-squat-
ting - from £1 to £2 - was, however, in its own way a form
of rackrenting,. for the fee was passed on to the renter.
Hardship did therefore result, and the loss of livelihood -
though Merriman stressed that care and caution should be
observed, so as to avoid individual losses. But what
really marked the new law was the way it differentiated be-
tween the labour - and the rent - tenants. In the former
case the licence fee was reduced to ten shillings.: the
motives are too obvious to need explication.
Administratively, on the other hand, Merriman was meti-
culously careful, constructive, attentive and generous.
This is the more noteworthy because of the brevity of his
premiership, and his preoccupations with a financial col-
lapse, his budgetary struggle, the wine-farmers1 revolt
against the excise, and his work on the National Convention
and steering the Draft Act of Union through parliament.
Despite his battle over his taxes, he refused emphatically
to consider raising the hut-tax: 'Did you ever hear a wore
monstrous proposition than...to let the poor white man go
free in order that we may put extra taxation on the Native
who is infinitely poorer; l44 He increased the education
grant for African schools - again despite his budgetary
problems - and appointed a Commission to investigate and
improve the content of the education provided. He passed a
Usury Act to abolish a pernicious means of preying on black
poverty - 'the fleecing of poor people by unscrupulous
white traders1;45 he provided additional agricultural
training facilities; and he organised a Mine Labour Con-
ference to discuss not only the more regular flow of labour
but also the many grievances and abuses he had unveiled
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personally or through his investigators and Commissions.46
With the halfhearted collaboration of the British
Government, he appointed a consular agent, E.H. Muller, to
watch over the treatment of coloured concession-holders and
black migrant labourers on the new G.S.W.A. diamond diggings.
Thanks to the joint efforts of Merriman and Muller, lawyers
were appointed at trials involving Cape workers, who were
often unjustly accused of illicit diamond buying, the
greatest care was taken to prevent contracts being broken,
and any form of ill-treatment was monitored. When the
British Government felt it diplomatic to curtail these
efforts, Merriman wrote indignantly to Muller: 'I am
pointing out to them how absurd is the position of an Agent
of this Colony if his hands are to be tied in any represen-
tation he may make on behalf of British subjects - be the
colour of their skins what they may. Behind the whole
correspondence lurks the idea that a black man has no rights,
a doctrine to which I am unable to submit1.47
These were only some of his concerns. He intended to
develop a railway network through the Ciskei and Transkei,
and promote savings banks and credit institutions. When
one reads his minutes and memoranda and the daily trivia of
the Native Affairs Department, the 'Cape system1 he so
valued reveals much more than its shallow political content.
Not only Merriman's instructions, but the reports and
letters of ministers and magistrates, clerks and commission-
ers, show a politeness and accessibility - an awareness that
they were dealing with individual lives not mere ethnic
abstractions - that survived and lingered on for several
decades after Union.
Despite its glib optimism and complacency, the distinc-
tive quality of Cape administration in this final phase was
its friendly humanity. Enquiries and complaints were
promptly dealt with. Small requests were granted: such as
paid holiday leave for African constables. Local initiative
was encouraged: the gift, for example, of free land for
schools and churches which planted trees around their plots.
Witnesses were meticulously traced in a case involving
customary law. The encroachment of white traders on tribal
commonage was prevented.4** And an appeal from the govern-
ment of Natal for common action against the independent
'Ethiopian1 church was instantly refused: Dower, the
Secretary for Native Affairs, replied that the Cape could
not treat doctrines as seditious without legal evidence, and
that freedom of speech was highly prized by blacks. 'It
would be out of the question to enforce the proposed restric-
tions against an enlightened and politically influential man
like Rev. Dr. Rubusana.. .it would be no less unjust to take
from the humblest Church member his birthright as a British
subject1. The Ministry supported this stand, Merriman
adding characteristically that Christianity itself was once
seen as a menace to the temporal power.49
Cape complacency shows in the almost mandatory remark in
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bluebooks on how much progress has been achieved in the past
thirty-five years. Self-congratulation is juxtaposed with
regret that so much remains to be done, and that many areas
show signs of regression and were noticeably poorer than
they used to be. Yet Stanford notes the 'perfect immunity
from crimes of violence1 which whites in the Territories
enjoy; other magistrates comment on the decline of stock-
theft; and on the hotly argued question of drink restric-
tion, it appears that in some locations where drink is
permitted drunkenness has not increased but the reverse is
true in some 'local option' (dry) areas.50
One magistrate notes the 'very limited scope for material
advancement allowed by present conditions to the industrious
and progressive Native...The careful and energetic indivi-
dual who had amassed some wealth but not sufficient to en-
able him to pay the high price required for a farm is with
reason dissatisfied with his small plot of ground in the
location' and additional land should be opened to him. An
official commission confirms this.51
The characteristic Cape ambivalence shows in attitudes to
migrancy. On the one hand, the Stanford Commission on
land tenure advises against ejecting relatives from over-
crowded locations: 'The Commission will be slow to re-
commend drastic change in advance of the sentiment of the
people in matters intimately affecting the condition of
their social life1, and think it morally and socially heal-
thy for migrants to return to their home base. This
stresses the function of the location as a labour reser-
voir.52 On the other hand, migrancy was also, under certain
conditions, seen as what Fagan (in the Fagan Report) des-
cribes as a 'bridge1; for in town areas, where workers had
been congregating for several decades, the non-party Commit-
tee on Native Affairs (which Merriman set up) recommended
the permanent settlement of Native 'labouring classes' where
they could have a home life and live in decent surroundings;
there was a growing tendency for such permanent settlement
near labour centres, 'and it would be a serious step and one
opposed to our traditional Native policy', to adopt any
measures which might have the effect of 'retarding the mate-
rial progress of the Natives concerned1. There was the
less reason 'to discourage such schemes of Native proprietor-
ship1 because they tended toward segregation: 'a policy
which has been definitely recognized in regard to urban
areas, and one which, within certain limits and with certain
safeguards, it is the opinion of the committee is in the
interests of both races to foster1.53 Similarly Stanford
asked for permanent status for the peasants and market-
gardeners who had established themselves outside the towns
on the commonage.53
A tart comment in some magistrates' reports advises that
the farm labour problem would be solved if better wages were
paid and decent housing offered. Wages were indeed low.
Coloured farm-servants, cattleherds and shepherds earned
Cape Liberaliem in its Terminal Phase 19.
about twelve shillings a month with keep (at a very meagre
level). (The cash equivalent today is about R24,OO).
Coloured artisans, however, earned 4s 6d to 5s a day, which
overlapped with the lower level of white artisans1 wages.
Coloured payment on wine farms could be as high as 3s 6d to
4s a day with food, wine 'tots' and quarters; ostrich farms
paid 14s 3d a week and white foremen and head shepherds
(presumably poor whites) earned only 18s a month (worth
about 1*32,00 today). In the Eastern Province agricultural
wages for Africans were lower than in the west (for coloureds
and the increasing number of African migrants): the average
was about £1 10s a month but the calculations are complicated
by the labour-squatting system, where wages were lower and
very arbitrary. Mine wages were £2 12s 2d a month - about
the same as the Cape railways. De Beers paid more and were
preferred to the gold mines. The link between debt, im-
poverishment and migrant labour is clearly evident in the
bluebooks, with their tale of rising numbers leaving annually
for work - 67 825 in 1908 and 79 377 in 1910.54
By the late nineteenth century Social Darwinism was a
pronounced ideological and anti-intellectual influence, which
left its imprint on the Cape. Thus E.H. Muller gratuitously
prefaced a memorandum for the Cape Labour Conference by
stating that South Africa presented *the greatest experiment
in labour relations...ever known...Two races - widely diver-
gent in the average capacity of their individuals and the
development of their social organisation - must know how to
live together1. Among the whites a 'repugnance (existed)
against risking any undue familiarity with the Native by
working side by side with him on equal terms...it is perhaps
fortunate that the bar of colour exists between them; in
respect of marriage or too free an intercourse...might result
in social embitterment...(and) a premature fusion of races'55
Merriman was ironically aware of the anomaly of social
segregation, which crystallized the axiom of white mastership
underlying late Victorian and Edwardian Cape liberalism. In
a letter to H.G. Wells, who had rather harshly compared Cape
practices with those in the southern states of the U.S.A.,
he wrote:
It is not too much to say that there is no colony
under the British flag where such liberal and just
treatment in the matter of the franchise, the owner-
ship of land, and that of education is accorded
to an alien race as in the Cape Colony, where the
care of such matters has for a generation been en-
trusted to the local Parliament on whose shoulders
rests the responsibility for any failure in admini-
stration. Of course the social difficulty re-
mains and as far as one can see will always remain.
The colour line is strongly drawn in all social
matters as it is in every part of the world, India
included, where the Teutonic and Coloured races come
in contact, nor does it show any appreciable signs
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of becoming less strongly marked. Herein lies
the great danger in the.future of this insoluble
problem. Aristocracies are seldom permanent.
...Fortunately liberal treatment, however dis-
tasteful it may be to our fine social antipathies,
seems to promise a better solution than arbitrary
violence or mere race assertion...56
When Merriman's premiership ended the Chief Magistrate of
the Transkei wrote to him: 'it will be a satisfaction to
you to know that the Natives in these territories...were
never in a more loyal and contented condition than at the
present time1. Allowing for the superficiality - for how
contented are the very poor? - and for the anxiety for the
future that Stanford had observed, this tribute seems
merited. Despite all its contradictions, the Cape liberal
tradition, both in politics and administration, had reached
its greatest extension and development just before it was
engulfed in Union.
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